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Let us look at how the modality ♦ is evaluated at a point t ∈ S. This is done by clause ( * 1)
( * 1) t ♦A iff ∃s(tRs and s A).
Let us write ( * 1) slightly differently, stressing which model we are using ( * 2) t ♦A in the model m = (S, R, a) iff for some s ∈ S such that tRs we have s A in m.
Clause ( * 2) can be changed to a fibring clause. Suppose we associate with every s ∈ S, a new Kripke model m s = (S s , R s , s) and we modify ( * 2) to be ( * 3) for a fibred modality ♦ F (see [7] ).
( * 3) t ♦ F A in m iff for some s ∈ S such that tRs, we have s A in m s . Figure 1 describes the situation.
We switch evaluation at s from the model m to the model m s . In a way this is a kind of multimodal logic with models of the form n = (S, R s , s ∈ S) and the jump operators J s , s ∈ S and the modality ♦. Evaluation is two dimensional as follows:
( * 4) t s ♦A iff for some u, tR s u and u s A t s J u A iff t u A
According to ( * 4) the modality of ( * 3) can be written as
( * 5) t s ♦ F A iff for some u, tR s u and u s J u A.
Note that public announcement logic (see references [1, 15] ), reference [1] contains material on reactive public announcement logic is an example of this kind of operator. It has modalities of the form ♦ A , where A is a wff such that t A holds. The truth condition is: In reactive logic, we focus on R s being a variation of R, obtained by switching on and off accessibility connections in R. If we denote (x, y) ∈ R by x → y then the basic reactive unit is the double arrow
( * 6) t ♦ A B in (S, R) iff t B in (S
The reading of the double arrow is as follows. If you traverse the connection x → y, then send a signal and switch (on or off) the connection u → v. Using a family R of double arrows, we can move from one R s to another R s . We now explain how reactivity can work in the next subsection.
Reactive Kripke models
Reactive Kripke models were introduced in 2004 [3] and an expanded version published in [5] .
There are various options for kinds of reactivity Thus in a reactive Kripke model the double arrows change the models. Figure 3 shows what we see at each point depending on the paths. In fact the Kripke model of Fig. 3 is an ordinary Kripke model where the nodes are paths. We must remember to give the same assignment to any atom x at points abd and acd. That is why we encircled them in the Figure. We have all kinds of possibilities here, for the double arrow. See Figs. 4 and 5 1. Double arrow to an arc can switch it off (or on), i.e., disconnect (or connect) it.
If decorated with '−' then it switches the arc to off if it is on and leaves it as off if it is off. If decorated with '+' then it switches the arc on if it is off and leaves it on if it is on. If not decorated at all then it switches it on if it is off and off if on, this is called switch reactivity. 2. Double arrow to a point can delete it or can tell us to ignore it or tell us to skip it. If we skip d then at c we see e directly. If we delete d then both d and e are deleted from the model, because e is now unreachable from point a.
Theorem 1.2 There exist mono-modal logics which are complete for a class of reactive
Kripke frames but are not complete for any class of ordinary Kripke or neighbourhood frames, see [5] , and [4, Section 1]. Example 1.3 (Sample application: deontic logic) See [6, 14] . We model contrary to duty obligations using reactive Kripke models. See Fig. 6 .
There should be no fence (i.e., go to b ). But if there is a fence (i.e., you go to c and because of that only worlds with fence are accessible), then it must be white (do not go to e, go to d). Example 1.4 (Sample application: reactive grammars) See [10] .
We make a context free grammar reactive by allowing the system to switch rules on and off as it progresses. Figure 7 is such an example.
Theorem 1.5
Reactive context-free grammar can generate {a n b n c n | n = 1, 2, 3, . . .}, which ordinary CFG cannot. Example 1.6 (Sample application: reactive automata) See [2] .
An automaton is a state transitions system responding to input. We can therefore change the automaton table as we go along. This will give us a reactive automaton. See Every reactive automaton is equivalent to an ordinary automaton recognising the same set of words. So we do not gain in expressive power by going reactive (as we do in the case of reactive context free grammars) but we do gain simplicity. [9, 12, 13] . Figure 9 is an example of a network. It can be argumentation network, neural network, transportation network, predator-prey biological network and many more.
Theorem 1.7 Let A be an automaton (deterministic or non-deterministic) with k
Here the double arrows have their own meaning in each network and their availability greatly enhances the expressive power of such networks. For example Rule R n can deactivate itself after use, as in linear logic. For reactive Tableaux, see [4, 8] . Fig. 11 , we need different paths leading to x and y so that we can fold the model and make x = y = z, and then one path (leading to x) will see x i as accessible and the other path leading to y will see the y i as accessible.
We get Fig. 12 .
The situation in Fig. 13 does not allow us to have different paths to z = x = y if we fold x and y together. All we can get is Fig. 14. 
Ternary relations
This section shows that reactive models can simulate a ternary relation and thus relevance logics and conditionals A ⇒ B can be translated into a reactive modality
.
. This also means that the classical modal reading of 13 We cannot fold t A → B as t A implies t B is too poor to bring out the reachness of reactive Kripke models and we need something A ⇒ B reading first evaluate A and then evaluate B.
So t A ⇒ B iff whenever we evaluate t A in the model and the model changes as a result of the reactivity and we get a new model, then t B holds in the new model. Example 1.11 (Reduction of three place relation to reactive binary relation) This example shows how relevance logics, whose semantics requires a three place relation ρ(x, y, z) can be simulated using a reactive binary relation R.
We have for relevance A ⇒ B the following truth condition
The idea is very simple. Consider ρ(x, y, z) as a binary relation between the pair (x, y) and the points z. This we can represent in Fig. 15 In Fig. 15 , we know that (x, y) is related to z because as we go from x to y, we activate the connection y → z. We also know that (x, y) is not related to u because as we go from x to y we cancel the connection y → u.
Assume ρ(x, y, z i ) holds but ρ(x, y, v j ) does not. Let + be an activating arrow from the arc x → y to all the z i and − be a deactivating arrow from the pair x → y to all the v j .
The model is written as (S, R, a), where R is now a relation containing arrows x → y (written (x, y) ∈ R), and double arrows (x → y)
a is a {0, 1} function on arcs giving the active arcs and a (x,y) is updated from a and R according to the ±((x, y)(u, r)) ∈ R. a (t,s) is modified from a as follows:
Thus when we pass from x to y, we activate only those z i such as ρ(x, y, z i ) holds.
Thus if A ⇒ B denotes the binary relevance or conditional connective whose semantics involves the ternary relation ρ(x, y, z) and represents a reactive modality, then we translate
We expect that for every model (S, ρ) of ⇒ there exists a model (S, R, a) of , such that for every A, B and t ∈ S and h we have
The translation of ρ(x, y, z) suggested in Fig. 15 is not good enough. Consider the case of 2 points x, y and assume we have exactly ρ(x, x, x) and ρ(x, y, y) Figure 16 shows our proposed implementation From x we go to x. We cancel all paths from x to points z such that ¬ρ(x, x, z) and connect all paths to z such that ρ(x, x, z ) holds. So after going from x to x we are now at x again and we have no connection to y. 
In our case we need to check the cases of ρ(x, x, x) and ρ(x, y, y). Figure 16 shows that in both cases the relation works OK, but we have to evaluate now x B ⇒ C and y B ⇒ C (assuming x A and y A hold). But we cannot continue correctly because the diagram has changed. What we need is to go back to the initial position! To implement ρ(x, y, z), we need to do the following:
1. As we move from x to y, we connect y only to {z|ρ(x, y, z)}. Call this action as 'making sure that λzρ(x, y, z) is correct for (x, y)'. 2. If we continue now from y to z we do not want to activate the action described in (1) for (y, z), i.e., we do not want at this stage to 'make sure that λwρ(y, z, w) is correct for (y, z)', we just want to get to z. So in (1) while we are dealing with λzρ(x, y, z), we deactivate all actions for λwρ (y, z, w) . This requires double arrows of order 2. 3. As we actually pass through y → z, we reactivate all actions for λwρ(y, z, w).
We therefore propose to translate ρ(x, y, z) as in Fig. 17 . In this figure, ρ(x, y, z) and ¬ρ(x, y, u) and ρ(y, z, v) and ¬ρ(y, z, w) hold. Given a relation ρ ⊆ S × S × S, we simulate (S, ρ) by a model (S, R, a) built as follows.
Let a(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ S × S. Define R as follows:
holds and ±ρ(y, z, w) holds, then by (2) above ±((y, z), (z, w) ∈ R (respectively). We add to R also −((x, y), ((y, z) , (z, w))) ∈ R and also +((y, z), ((y, z) , (z, w))) ∈ R. Consider now the evaluation of (A → B) at x at a reactive model (S, R, a, x) (**) x (A → B) iff for all y such that (x, y) ∈ R and a(x, y) = 1 (i.e., for all arcs x → y which are active), we have y A → B holding at the model (S, R, a (x,y) , y) where a (x,y) is the updated activeness function.
We continue: (***) y A → B iff whenever y A then for all z such that (y, z) ∈ R and is a (x,y) active we have z B in the model (S, R, a (x,y,z) , z).
To have both definitions (*) and (**) and (***) to be the same we need ρ(x, y, z) to hold iff a (x,y) (y, z) = 1. Indeed, this is what Fig. 17 and items ( 1)- ( 4) show. So we have the following:
1. Given a reactive frame (S, R, a) the relation ρ(x, y, z) defined by (a (x,y) (y, z) = 1 gives us a relevance frame (S, ρ). We have for A ⇒ B = def (A → B) that x A ⇒ B iff (**) + (***) hold iff (*) holds for ρ. 2. We have also seen that given (S, ρ) , if we define (S, R, a) as in ( 1)-( 4), we can simulate ρ.
Thus the translation of
The interesting aspect of this example is that axioms on ⇒ become genuine axioms on the reactivity of a Kripke frame.
Introducing the logic KR, reactive modal K
We have two options for defining the reactive counterpart of modal K.
Option 1 Use only the modality which triggers the double arrows. Let us denote by ∅A and its possibility by PA = ¬ ¬A.
We have studied completeness theorems for such systems in [11] .
Option 2 Study modal K with both and P and the ordinary and ♦. We call this system KR. It has more expressive power and more applications, see [4, 14] . This paper deals with Option 2. The reactivity we used is switch reactivity.
Introducing and discussing the reactive semantics
Definition 2.1 (Reactive K model)
1. Let S be a non-empty set. A reactive relation on S has the form
where R 1 ⊆ S 2 and R 2 ⊆ S 2 × S 2 such that the following holds
We can represent the elements of R 1 as 'x → y' and the elements of 
2. Given a model m = (S, R 1 , R 2 , f, a, h) we define the notion of m A by induction as follows:
• Similarly for the other classical connectives
3. The logic KR (reactive K) is defined as the set of all wffs A such that for all models m we have m A. 4. Note that we have frames of the form (S, R 1 , R 2 , f). The logic is normal, as a and h can be chosen arbitrarily.
Remark 2.3
Note that the function f introduced in the previous Definition 2.1 actually defines another relation R 0 which is a subset of R 1 . When f changes to f [x,y] , as in item 1 of Definition 2.2, then equivalently R 0 changes to R 0 [x, y]. We use the notation with the function f to stress the fact that all reactivity changes arise from arrow connections from R 1 .
We now address the task of axiomatising the logic KR. To be able to do that effectively, let us familiarise ourselves better with KR and its unique features.
Consider Fig. 18 . Let our starting point be a. As we traverse the arc a → b , there are two possibilities. Let Possibility 1 be formalised by ♦ and let Possibility 2 be formalised by P. So we can write: a ♦q to mean traverse from a to the accessible world b and ignore all double arrows and we can write a Pq to mean traverse from a to the accessible world b and take account of the double arrows. The situation is different with a P♦P Evaluating here takes us to d P , but P is affected and takes account of double arrows and so d P does not hold and hence
We can go from a to e taking account of double arrows. Moving from a to b switches the connection d → e off but continuing from b to d switches it on again and therefore d P holds. Note that we cannot evaluate any x Pq, for arbitrary point x, without knowing how we got to x and which double arrows we activated along the path.
So asking does d ?P hold cannot guarantee an answer. We need to ask something like
where M i ∈ {♦, P}.
Note that we need a notion of legitimate sequences. This notion will be formally defined in Section 2.2 below. Meanwhile, we understand it intuitively. The sequence
is not legitimate because by the time we get to d, d → e is disconnected. So to get to e from d we need to use ♦.
We thus get a bimodal logic with two modalities ♦ and P with evaluation of formulas depending on paths (x 0 , . . . , x n ) but not ordinary paths. We also need to know how we traverse them. So our paths have the form
where t is a legitimate sequence.
Our task in this section is to find axioms and prove completeness for KR. We might have thought that it would be useful to consider KR as a bimodal logic with two accessibility relations R P and R ♦ , and see what properties they have. The problem is that the accessible worlds are the same for both relations, the difference being the way we traverse them. So really our most reasonable option is to consider a transformed Kripke model where the points/worlds are legitimate paths of the form
Thus we start with Fig. 18 , and then transform it to a model
where S * is the set of all legitimate sequences of the form t = (a,
We define R ♦ and R P by tR ♦ t * (My), when x n R 1 y, and M ∈ {♦, P} tR P t * ((Py), when x n R 1 y and t * (Py) is legitimate.
where * is concatenation of sequences. Let t q iff x n q, for q atomic. Note that R 1 and R 2 are replaced by R ♦ and R P . R 1 is used directly in the definition of the sequences t which go into S * and R 2 is used in the notion of legitimate sequences.
So m is replaced by its transformed model m * , see Fig. 19 . If we do that we can get a completeness theorem after some hard work. We are facing three formal tasks:
Task 1: Given a bimodal semantic model m * with two binary relation R and R , and with an equivalence relation ≡, such as the one in Fig. 19 , can we identify whether it comes from a KR model m such as the one in Fig. 18 ? In other words, can we identify when a bimodal model n * with an equivalence relation ≡ is actually a transformed version of another KR model n? Task 2: Axiomatise the logic K. Task 3: We need to systematically find corresponding axioms for various conditions on the KR relation R 1 . This Task we postpone to a future paper.
Obviously the transformed models will play a part, but we note that the transformed models may not be in the same class as the original model. The lucky aspect for the case of KR is that such models m * are also KR models because KR has no special requirements on the worlds or the relations. The unlucky or difficult aspect of using the transformed models as tools is that we need to uniquely identify paths, and to do that we need nominals or second order propositional quantifiers or in short we need more expressive power at our service and such power is not available at KR. So our strategy is to use technical devices which eliminate the need for nominals.
So much for KR. If we look at Fig. 18 we observe that the model is linear. If we were to insist on semantics which requires that (S, R 1 ) be linear then looking at the model m * of all legitimate paths gives us a non-linear model. This is not good. We are getting a model which is not in the correct linear semantics. So how do we axiomatise the linear case? The answer is that I don't know yet. For the purpose of many applications such as modelling contrary to duties, KR is sufficient, see [14] . We postpone the general theory of reactive modal semantics for dedicated future papers.
We now give you an idea of what kind of axioms we need for KR. We first note that both and (the duals of ♦ and P) are K modalities, satisfying the interaction axiom (for A not containing any ).
PA → ♦A
To explain what additional axioms we need, consider again Since the sequence (aPb ♦dPe) is not legitimate, the point d 3 is ♦ connected only to e 3 and is not P connected to e.
We now show you how to get an axiom. The axioms which we get allow us to retrieve the double arrow from the graph. Since 
Similarly, we identify a double arrow from The axiom we get in this case is
This axiom is not written in the modal language of KR. To express it in KR we need extra technical manipulation. If we have nominals, i.e., we have names for worlds, sayā names a,b names b ,d names d andē names e, i.e., we have y x iff y = x, then we can express the following in the logic KR + nominals:
by writing a α * where
Thus our axiom for Fig. 18 is
In general if t * (Py) is legitimate (not legitimate) and t 1 and t 2 are obtained by changing a single ♦ into P at each place n 1 and n 2 respectively and t 1 * (Py) and t 2 * (Py) becomes not legitimate (respe. becomes legitimate) then t 1,2 * (Py) does not make any change, where t 1,2 is obtained from t by changing both instances of ♦ (at places n 1 and n 2 ) into P.
This gives us the general form of our additional axioms. However, as we said, to express the axioms we need nominals in the language. The challenge is to express the axioms in KR without the use of nominals, by using some other technical device. This is indeed what we are going to do now!
Manipulating finite bi-modal Kripke models
This subsection prepares the ground for our KR completeness proof. Our strategy is to construct first a finite bi-modal tree Kripke model for the modalities ♦ and P and then convert this model to a finite KR model. To achieve this, we need to learn how to manipulate finite bi-modal Kripke models. This is the task of the current subsection.
Definition 2.4
1. Let ♦ and P be two modalities. A fintie Kripke model for these modalities has the form m = (S, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , a, h), where S is the finite set of possible worlds, a ∈ S is the initial root (actual) world and ρ 1 and ρ 2 are binary relations on S. We require that ρ 1 ∩ ρ 2 = ∅. h is an assignment giving each atomic q of the language a subset h(q) ⊆ S. 2. m is said to be a tree model if (S, ρ, a) is a tree with root a, where
This means that ρ is irreflexive and every node x ∈ S has a unique path (leading up to it) of the form (a,
where m i ∈ {♦, P} and x M −→ y means
We call the above annotated paths. We also write
for annotated paths. 3. Let m be a tree model. We define the notion of a level of a node x ∈ S as follows: Let n be the length of the maximal path in (S, ρ, a), i.e., there exists (a, Note that the level of a node x is n − k where k is its "distance" from the root a.
Definition 2.5 (Path nominals for bi-modal models) Let m = (S, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , a, h) be a finite tree bi-modal Kripke model. Let δ be a function associating with each x ∈ S, a formula δ(x) of the bi-modal langauge with ♦, P. We say δ is a system of path nominals for m iff the following holds:
2. Let xρ 1 y and xρ 1 z and y = z hold then δ(y) ∧ δ(z) has no finite tree model (i.e., they are semantically consistent). 3. If x is of level k then δ(x) has at most n − k nested modalities.
Remark 2.6
1. Note that if a finite model m has a system of path nominals as in Definition 2.5, then the following holds for any t ∈ S
2. Note also that the restriction (3) on δ of Definition 2.5 is not really restrictive because we have the proposition (*):
(*) If t is of level k then for any wff A there exists a formula A with at most n − k nested modalities such that t A ↔ A .
This can be proved by induction on n − k, where n is the level of the model m.
Remark 2.7
Note that the concept of path nominals is intended to identify paths and not necessarily identify worlds. Consider can be identified uniquely.
) be a finite tree model and let δ be a system of path nominals for m. Let M i ∈ {♦, P} and let (a, x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a path. 
Thus the annotated path t is more specific about how we get to x n . 2. Consider the wff
3. Define the modality M as follows:
(X). We call this formula a one point change of The first figure describes a KR model for ♦ and P. The second figure describes the unfolding of this KR model into a bi-modal tree model for the two modalities ♦ and P.
A path nominal system can be defined on the model of Fig. 22 as follows:
If we are given the model of As part of the conversion/retrieval process, we need to identify the effects of the double arrow
which resides in Fig. 21 and has manifestations in Fig. 22 , namely that b 2 ¬Pδ(c 3 ). To achieve such an identification we use the P-test formulas.
We formally want to convert the model of Fig. 22 into a reactive bi-modal model of Fig. 23 by adding a set R 2 of double arrows and an activity function f. We let R 1 = ρ ♦ ∪ ρ P and let the P and ♦ modalities traverse all connections of R 1 .
Obviously, adjustments are needed! The end result we hope is a model equivalent to that of Fig. 21. 1. Consider the formula
and consider
We have a and a , namely the value changed when we changed
We have a ϕ and a ϕ . The correct way of dealing with this is to declare a → b 1 as off. ♦ will ignore it and P will not be able to traverse it. We can also in this particular case add the double arrows as well as
3. Also consider
This is already taken care of by (1) above. Had it been the case that b 2 had no P predecessors, we would have declared b 2 → c 3 as off! But this is not needed here.
The P tests show that if we change P to ♦ or ♦ to P the truth values switch. This calls for double arrows as discussed in Fig. 23 . Now consider the model in Fig. 23 as a KR model with the relation R 1 = ρ P ∪ ρ ♦ and R 2 as drawn. The assignment is the same as in Fig. 21, 
So, when we evaluate a PA in Fig. 21 , we go to point b and activate the double arrow. When we evaluate a PA in Fig. 23 , we either go to b 1 or go to b 2 and activate the respective double arrows in each case.
When we go to b 2 , the double arrow deactivates b 2 → c 3 and so ¬Pδ(c 3 ) holds but ♦δ(c 3 ) still holds because ♦ ignores the effects of double arrows.
Similarly 
where ε t is a conjuctive form, i.e., ε = q∈Q ±q and where π(t) ranges over all maximal paths of the form (t,
.).
Note that π is δ π ( ) as def ined in Def inition 2.8.
Proof By induction on n − k, where k is the level of t 1. The case of n − k = 0 is clear.
2. The case of n − k = 1 is also clear since any theory of a node x of n − 1 has the form δ( 
Next observe that by the induction hypothesis each δ(z), z ∈ {x i , y j } has the form
where η(z) ranges over all maximal paths starting at z. Therefore A t has the form
We want to rewrite form (8) of Lemma 2.14 in the form (*1) above. To achieve that let us first write each π = (t,
Second, let us use ( ) and rewrite (*) into two conjuncts:
Now since δ is a system of path nominals (see item 1(c) of Remark 2.6): we can continue and rewrite
Remark 2.15 Note that the representation of the path nominals in Lemma 2.14 uses formulas of the positive (in P, ♦) form
We do not use ¬M in π . So we do not use formulas of the form
We now want to give definitions and theorems which convert a finite bi-modal model m into an equivalent finite reactive model m (as in Definition 2.1). We need to develop some definitions of path nominals for such models. So we will define the notions of legitimate paths and path nominals for the models of Definition 2.1. 1 , R 2 , f, a, h ) be a KR model as in Definition 2.1. We define by induction the notion of a legitimate path t = (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M n x n ), where aR 1 x 1 ∧ . . . x n−1 R 1 x n hold and M i ∈ {♦, P}, i = 1, . . . , n. We also define the functions f t , t a legitimate path. a legitimate path and f (a) = f. = (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M n x n ) is a legitimate path and assume that f (a,x1,...,xn) has been defined. Let y be such that x n R 1 y holds. Then  (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M n x n , ♦y) is a legitimate path and let f t * (♦y) = f t . 3. Assume as in (2) that t = (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M n x n ) is a legitimate path and that f t has been defined. Let y be such that x n R 1 y and that f t (x n , y) = 1. This means that x n is an endpoint, as far as M is concerned. 5. Let S π be the set of all legitimate paths of S. 1 x 1 , . . . , M n x n ) a wff δ t of the logic such that the following hold:
Definition 2.16 (Legitimate paths) Let m = (S, R

(a) is
Assume that t
Definition 2.17 (Path nominals for reactive models) Let m = (S, R 1 , R 2 , f, a, h) be a f inite KR model. Let δ be a function defined on S π giving for each legitimate path t = (a, M
1. Let y, z be such that x n R 1 y ∧ x n R 1 z ∧ y = z. Let s 1 = t * (My) and s 2 = t * (Mz), M ∈ {♦, P}. Then δ s1 ∧ δ s2 has no reactive model, i.e., it is semantically not consistent.
t δ t in the model m t = (S, R 2 , R 2 , f t , t, h).
Note that from (1) and (2) above it follows that for
In other words, δ ti act as nominals for the path t. 4. It will be convenient for us in the future to use another function δ * t associating with each t a distict atomic formula q t . We can abuse notation and write 'δ * t ' for 'q t '. The atoms q t (or δ * t if we abuse notation) are intended to act as path nominals.
Definition 2.18
Let m = (S, ρ 2 , ρ 2 , a, h) be a reduced finite tree model based on a finite set of atoms. By Lemmas 2.13 and 2.14
is a path nominal system for m. Let R 1 = ρ 1 ∪ ρ 2 . We shall now define a set R 2 of double arrows for m, as well as an activity function f.
Let t ∈ S and let
We distinguish several cases.
(a) Case 1. For some y such that x r ρ 2 y (and therefore t To be able to prove that we need some properties (axioms) of ♦, P which will manifest themselves as properties of R 2 . With the right axioms ( 1) might hold. Let us examine ( 1) more closely. It is clear immediately that ( 1) is not properly formualted. The model m is a reactive model and so we cannot ask for t ∈ S the simple question, does t A in m , we need to know the legitimate path leading to t. So let
where x r = t. We ask does ( 2) hold?
Note that the question is not simple. Consider When we convert it to the model m (we need to know the assignment h to convert and define R 2 and f, but let us ignore that) we may get new paths, such as 
(Pδ(y)).
Let P π be the set of all j in{1, . . . , r} such that π has P in the j position. Let I, J ⊆ P π be two disjoint sets such that I ∪ J = P π and
Then the number of elements in J is even.
This calls for the following axiom:
for any π = (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M r x r ) and where x r ρ 2 y holds and P π and I, J are defined as above, and J has an odd number of elements. The reason that J must be even is that if we traverse the path from a to t and trigger all double arrows as defined in Case 1 of Definition 2.18 then when we get to x r we still have x r Pδ y ) (since x r ρ 2 y holds). So the double arrows must cancel each other, so J must be even. In fact, the situation is much more complex than that as we shall now analyse. Assume that x r P −→ y in m. We want to make sure that f π * (x r → y) = 1 in m . Figure 25 shows what we need to worry about −→ x 2 in m by using possible ♦, (i.e., ♦x 2 ∈ π * ), then the double arrows
and
are not activated and no signal is sent to the arc x r P −→ y. So there are several possibilities of what can happen in m .
(a) x i → x i+1 gets 'hit' by an odd number of active double arrows which were activated by π * on its way to x i , and is not active in m and therefore the only way that π * gets through to x r is because it uses
is active in m (receives an even number of double arrows) and π gets through x i → x i+1 either as ♦ or as P. (c) Depending on how π * passes through x i → x i+1 we will know whether the double arrow
is activated in m or not and so whether x r P −→ y is 'hit' by it.
We need to show that the net effects in m of all double arrows received by x r → y from any active and P-traversed x i → x i+1 in π * is that their number is even and therefore x r → y is active in m * . We need to write an axiom to ensure that outcome. We need some notation:
). This means that in m we have
π * π be the set of all i such that x i P −→ x i+1 is in both π and in π * .
Define the predicate Active (x s → s s+1 , π, π * ) by
π,π * } has an even number of elements.
To write an axiom RA expressing what is needed (RA for reactive axiom) we need to translate the predicate Active(x s → x s+1 ) into logic. This we do as follows: "Active" translates "Active"
π,π * } has an even number of elements and = Active((x s → x s+1 ), π, π * ) = ⊥ otherwise. Where in classical logic 'the set of the true propositions {a 1 , . . . , a k } has an even number of elements' can be written as
The axiom RA is
Note that there is a restriction on π * that it only allowed to change some Px i in π into a ♦x i in π * . Note that the axiom RA was defined using satisfaction in the model m through its system δ of path nominals. To write a syntactic axiom for the completeness proof we need to use variables for the syntactical description of m and define δ syntactically. Let μ m , δ m be the wffs doing this job. Then μ → RA(μ) is an axiom for each μ. This is done in Section 3. This will give us an infinite set of axioms for each syntactical finite tree with two successor functions. and t ♦δ(s 1 ). If in m we allow ♦ to traverse also t P −→ s 2 , we may have a problem. Maybe we have that t ¬♦δ(s 2 ) holds in m but if we allow ♦ to get to s 2 we will we get a contradiction? The answer is that we need not worry. In m , when we go to s 2 from t we trigger some double arrows and so we can prove that in m s 2 δ(s 2 ) (i.e., the model changes). We also show that if there are no double arrows emanating from t P −→ s 2 , then t ¬♦δ(s 2 ) cannot be the case. As for traversing t P −→ s 1 in m , this has been forbidden by Case 2 of Definition 2.18. 
where Case (n − r) = 0 In this case δ(x r ) is a classical model (i.e., ε is a conjunctive normal form of atoms from Q) and so ( ) holds.
where ε i and η j are classical models.
The same holds in m because PA → ♦A holds for A not containing P and in m all arrows of the form u Since in m we have x r R 1 y, we also get that x r ♦δ(y) in m π * . Assume now that x r ρ 2 z holds in m and that x r ¬♦δ(z) in m and of course x r Pδ(z) in m. Look at x r from the point of view of m π * ; we see that x r R 1 z holds and therefore we have to ensure that we do not have that δ(z) holds at z in m (π * ,♦z) .
Note that the models m (π * ,♦z) and m (π * ,Pz) may not be the same because in the model m (π * ,Pz) the activity function is f π * [x r , z], while in the model m (π * ♦z) the activity function if f π * . We know by the induction hypothesis that in the model m (π * ,Pz) we do have that z δ(z).
The question is does z δ(z) hold in m (π * ,♦z) ? We want it not to hold.
This we now proceed to prove. We consider two possibilities for the arc x r P −→ z.
Possiblity 1
There is at least one double arrow emanating from x r P −→ z into the model m (π * ,Pz) . This means that for some (M 1 w 1 , . We can assume that there is no double arrow of the form (x r → z) → (w i → w i+1 ) for i < s. This ensures that s is minimal and we don't have to worry about other double arrow changes along the way from x r to s! This means by Definition 2.18 that (x → z) (w s → y) ∈ R 2 . We now consider δ(x r ). According to Lemma 2.14, we have that (y) ). But this means that at x r , ♦δ(z) = Pδ(z) in m so x r ♦δ(z) (see Remark 2.15) contrary to our assumption.
Subcase of P We now examine the case of P. Assume x r ρ 1 z and assume x r ¬Pδ(z) in m. This means that for all y such that x r ρ 2 y we have y ¬δ(z) in m. Hence by the induction hypothesis, y ¬δ(z) in m (π * ,Py) . Hence we have that in m π * , x r ¬Pδ(z). The reason for the last step is that any y such that x r ρ 1 y is not accessible for P, i.e., How can it be the case that f π * (x r → z) = 0? This can happen if along the path π = (a, M 1 x 1 , . . . , M r x r ) an odd number of double arrows was triggered towards the arc x r → z. To see what this means we go to Case 1 of Definition 2.18. But then let us also consider Remark 2.19 and axiom RA. We will be in violation of axiom RA if an odd number of double arrows hits x r → z. The axiom says that x r → z must be active. This completes the induction case and the Lemma is proved.
We now have almost all that we need for the completeness proof. We basically take axiom RA and construct a Henkin type reduced model m, convert it to m and use Lemma 2.20.
This we shall do in the next Section 3.
Completeness theorem for KR
This section provides an axiom system and a completeness theorem for the logic KR as defined semantically in Definition 2.1. Our strategy is as follows: Given a formula A, we want to construct a model for it. A has a finite number of atoms and no more than n nested modalities, and so we expect to construct a finite model of level n with an assignment to the atoms of A. We need to find the right axioms which will enable us to carry out the construction of the correct model.
We begin by syntactically defining all finite models. This is done in Definition 3.1. We also define syntactically a natural system of path nominals for each model and using it we can talk syntactically about paths π and their associated paths π * . Armed with this syntactical capability, we can write Axiom 3 of Definition 3.4. The formulation of this axiom was discussed at length on page 35 in part 3 of Remark 2.19.
We mention that this axiomatisation is brute force (see discussion below in Remark 3.7), we cannot get around it without possibly adding more connectives.
The reader should note that there is a difference of culture here between the pure mathematical logician and the applied logician. The pure logician would tend to axiomatise with minimum number of connectives and minimum number of variables used. The Polish school of logic, for example, is well known for its minimal axiomatisations of classical logic and its variants, an ongoing activity which was slowed down only by the Second World War.
The applied logician would be more inclined to add connectives and constants as long as they have a natural meaning in the application area. We shall address this possibility in the concluding section.
3.1 Methodological presentation of the axioms for KR Definition 3.1 (Syntactical models) Let Q = {q 1 , . . . , q k } be a set of atoms and let S be an infinite set of names of possible worlds. We shall define inductively the family of all n-level syntactical models together with their possible world realisation and a path nominal function δ for each such model. , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , a μ , h) where
We assume a μ , t ε , s ε are all different elements of S. We let a μ ρ 1 t ε , ε ∈ I and a μ ρ 2 s ε , ε ∈ J. Let
Assume the syntactical models are defined for any level ≤ m. Also assume that for any such syntactical model μ a realisation model n μ = (S μ , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , a μ , h) is also defined with 
Define the level m + 1 realisation model for μ as follows:
For each α ∈ I, β ∈ J let n α = (S In this figure, s → r is off, so ♦Pq is false at t, however, PPq is the true at t, because the double arrow (t → s) (s → r) is triggered by P and so it activates the connection s → r and hence s Pq.
Remark 3.7
The perceptive reader will have noticed that our axiomatisation of KR is a 'brute-force' axiom system. Our 'axioms' simply describe syntactically the correct semantics. Perhaps the reader would have expected a nicer axiom system. This is not possible. We shall offer an explanation by giving an example.
Consider ordinary modal logic K with a single modality ♦. Its models have the form (S, R, a) , a ∈ S, R ⊆ S × S and R is not necessarily reflexive. The truth condition for ♦ is (1).
1. t ♦A iff for some s, tRs and s A. Let us now change the semantics a bit. Consider models of the form (S, E, R, a), with E ⊆ S. We change the truth condition to be 2.
t ∈ E and for some s, tRs and s A and t ∈ E and t A or for some s, tRs and s A Thus the set E tells us that we want reflexivity. Now define a family of finite models (S, E, R, a, h) as follows. Take any finite model m = (S, R, a, h ). Code this model by a Turing machine. Apply an effective procedure to extract a set E m ⊆ S, and define the new model n = (S, E m , R, a, h ).
Let the logic K R be defined by the set of all such model n. Now I ask the reader how can you axiomatise this logic without syntatically describing the models n?
If the definition of n is simple we can probably do it nicely but otherwise bruteforce is needed.
For example, we can let t ∈ E iff ∃x(xRt ∧ ¬xRx).
Then maybe we can axiomatise this logic nicely.
In the case of KR we allow double arrows to go anywhere and we can switch connections on and off. This is too free to control nicely, so brute-force is called for. Our difficulty is compounded by the fact that we do not have any modality or other special connective controlling the double arrows, so our only means to describe their behaviour is through the coding of the changes they cause in the model, hence the need for a brute force axiomatisation.
Here are some simple conditions on reactivity which can make for nicer logics. Next step reactivity If (x → y) (w → z) ∈ R 2 then y = w. I.e. we are allowed double arrows only in the form of Fig. 28 Forward look reactivity The target of the next arrow must be above the target of a previous arrow. Namely if
and for some m ≥ 1
Then for some n uρ n u
In words: a later arrow must 'hit' a later target. Figure 29 illustrates the idea.
The canonical model
We now construct a canonical finite reduced model for two modalities P and ♦ and then covert it to a KR model. We shall construct a finite model for any consistent formula A. This will also give us finite model property and decidability. Our starting point is to construct a very specific bi-modal finite model with two accessibility relations, one for and the other for . Additional axioms will allow us to convert this special model into a reactive one.
We need some definitions.
A wff
A is said to be of level n if n is the maximal number of nested {P, ♦} in A. Let A be a consistent wff. We want to construct a finite model for A. Let q 1 , . . . , q k be all atomic sentences appearing in A and let n be the maximal number of nested modal operators {P, ♦} in A.
Step 1 We first extend A to a theory containing A satisfying the following conditions 1. For any wff B built up from {q 1 , . . . , q k } and containing no more than n nested modalities we have B ∈ or ¬B ∈ 2.
is KR consistent. We shall construct a finite model for .
Step 2a Let PD ∈ . We say E D of level ≤ n − 1 is maximal for PD ∈ , iff P(D ∧ E D ) ∈ and whenever Px ∈ and X is of level ≤ n − 1 and
We now show that such an E D exists.
Lemma 3.8 Let PY ∈ and let X be any wf f of level
and hence ¬Y ∈ contradicting the consistency of .
From the lemma it follows that we can add inductively ±X m+1 to P(Y ∧ ±x 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±x m ) and hence such a maximal E D exists for any PD ∈ . This is so because assume we added Y i such that P(Y ∧ Y i ) ∈ and for every Z of level ≤ n − 1, there exists an i such that
If Y i = ¬U then we get that U ¬U, i.e., U ⊥ and so P⊥ ∈ . This is not possible.
Let
∈ be the entire list of all such maximal wffs, i = 1, . . . , r n . Note that the index 'n' in 'r n ' is the level n of the theory . In the sequel we shall use theories of level n − m, m = 1, 2, . . . and we shall respectively use r n−m , m = 1, 2 . . .. Similarly we shall introduce below s n , s n−1 . . .
Step 2b Similarly suppose we have that ♦B ∈ , then there exists a maximal E B such that ♦(B ∧ E B ) ∈ .
We need another lemma. The above two step considerations proved the following. Step 3 Consider the situation of Lemma 3.11. Step 4 We start with a complete and consistent theory of Q n and construct a finite tree model for it as follows. (S, R, ρ ♦ , ρ P ) is the tree. We first define S and R in steps.
For each PD
Construction step 4.0 Let 0 ∈ S and let 0 = .
Construction step 4.1 Consider the situation described in Lemma 3.11 for . Let (0, i), i = 1, . . . , r n + 1 be new elements which we put into S and let The construction stops at m = n − 1. We get a set S of sequences t ∈ S. The set forms a tree under the relation tRs iff ∃x(s = t * (x)). With each t of length m we have a theory
Define an assignment h as follows: t q iff q ∈ t .
Lemma 3.12
In the model (S, R, ρ ♦ , ρ P , a, h) we have for any wf f of level ≤ n − m and any t of length m
Proof By induction on A For atoms this holds.
Consider the case of PA. The proof for ♦ is similar.
We have proved weak completeness for the logic with ♦ and P using the axioms of K for each.
We got R = ρ ♦ ∪ ρ P and we need to covert this model to a model of KR with R 1 and R 2 .
We now need to use our additional axioms RA to determine how ρ P is correctly derived from a set of double arrows R 2 .
Remark 3.13
We make some observations about the model (S, R, ρ ♦ , ρ P , 0, h) which we constructed.
Let t m = (0, x 1 , . . . , x m ) be a point in the tree. Let t i = (0, x 1 , . . . , x i ), i ≤ m. We know t i+1 = t i * (x i+1 ). We write x i Mi −→ x i+1 . Clearly by the completeness theorem Lemma 3.12, we also have 0 β tm . Following Lemma 3.10 β tm uniquely characterises the path leading to t m in the model. Therefore δ * x = E x , as defined in Lemma 3.11, can act as path nominals for the points t via their validity at 0. Proof From Theorem 3.14.
Concluding remarks
We saw that reactive models are very useful and the idea of reactivity is applicable in many areas. The basic system KR of modal reactivity turned out to be not so easily axiomatisable and this calls for possibly some simplifying assumptions on the reactive double arrows, possibly emerging from applications.
So this is one direction of future research. Another direction is to look at some of the new additional modal connectives and use them to introduce reactivity. We chose ♦ and P, where ♦ ignores reactivity and P uses it. This is the most direct and natural connective. However, we can approach reactivity 'sideways' as can be seen from Fig. 30 .
Since our models are trees, the node x i+1 completely identifies the arc x i → x i+1 . Similarly, the node v completely identifies u → v. Thus if we add a new binary relation R 3 on S with v R 3 x reading
• There is a double arrow of the form ((predecessor of x) → x) ((predecessor of v) → v)
We can map all double arrows this way. So in a reactive model, R 2 can be represented by R 3 . So we can have a new modality say ♦ for double arrows. We can add a special proposition on and have v ♦ on iff ∃x(v R 3 x ∧ x on) This device may give us some scope for simplifying the axiomatisation but we still need to represent the switch nature of the double arrows. We still have to count how many 'hits' v receives, and it is this part which makes the axiomatisation complicated.
We invite the reader to use the classical translation of modal logic into classical logic. In classical logic we have the full power of the classical quantifiers and still it is not simple to express that {y | xR 3 y} is odd.
Furthermore, ♦ can ignore the double arrows and so we need to count the 'hits' from arcs not ignored by ♦. 'Ignored by ♦' implies 'motion' along the arcs and this is foreign to traditional modal logic or to classical logic.
My guess is that axiomatising with the aid of ♦ or any additional tricks would still be very complicated.
Of course good restrictions on the reactivity can simplify the system considerably, and with good luck the simplified system may still be interesting and applicable. One such restriction is the next step reactivity, mentioned in Remark 3.7. Figure 31 explains the idea of the proof.
Proposition 4.1 Any next step reactivity logic system is equivalent to a bi-modal system with one modality implying the other! Proof
So that is simple enough! It is also still more powerful. Theorem 1.2 still holds.
So we need to find good conditions on R 1 and R 2 of the semantics! Indeed, there is still lots to be done. If we use the relation R 3 and the modality ♦ , we get the situation in Fig. 33 . Now we have a situation with ordinary double arrows, so we can use a new relation R 4 and a modality ♦ to eliminate all double arrows, as in Fig. 34 . We must remember that yR 4 x indicates double arrows from the arc ((the R 1 predecessors of x) → x) to the arc ((the R 3 predecessor of y) → y). So when we have many relations R, a better notation would be as follows:
Use R R1,R1 instead of R 3 . Use R (R1(R1,R1) ) instead of R 4 .
The conclusion from this example is that higher level double arrows can be reduced to multiple modalities. Looking at it the other way round, (in the spirit of Proposition 4.1) multimodal logic can be reduced (given the right conditions) to a higher level reactive modal logic with one modality.
These investigations we postpone for later.
